On Facebook (where you can also be my friend if you’d like), Adam replies to the latest installment of the “Disambiguating Faith” series with this question:
Hate to be corny, but in an episode of House M.D., every rational road runs out and a case is seemingly unsolvable. Finally, by eliminating a symptom (which is basically forbidden in medical practice) Dr. House explains the disease and saves the atheist priest. When asked what the hallucination of Jesus was, House says “not a symptom”. House says the fact that he was wrong doesn’t prove the existence of God, but is it rational to at times cease rationality? If it is rational to rule out the rational at times, can a religious person argue that one can acheive truth only with faith?
I don’t understand the example from House. I don’t know what “eliminating a symptom” means exactly. Is it that he decides not to treat a hallucination of Jesus as a symptom and then diagnoses the problem by only looking at the remaining symptoms? In that case, what is irrational about that? What is “faith-based” in that? That’s just figuring out that one problem (the cause of the hallucinations) is distinct from another problem (whatever is causing the rest of the symptoms). That’s quite rational: you are (a) figuring out that not all symptoms are caused by the same maladies, (b) isolating which ones are properly associated together and which ones are not, and then (c) rationally treating the properly discerned source of the one constellation of maladies that does not involve the hallucinations. How is that a justification for believing things without reasons?
And no, it’s not ever rational to “cease rationality,” that’s simply incoherent. There are times in which we might rationally act in ways that are contrary to our beliefs about what is most likely true. For example, if there is only a 1% chance that a bomb is in the building we should believe that there is not a bomb and yet act as though there was and evacuate the building. The reasons for behaving thus are themselves rational, even though they conflict with what we believe most likely to be the case. If they were not rational reasons they would not be good reasons and if there are not good reasons an action it is not a rational one.
Finally, is it possible for there to be truths that can only be assented to by faith? Yes. But there cannot be truths justifiably assented to by faith. What I mean is that there might be true things that one can hold as beliefs only if one guesses. I may only believe that there are exactly 7 dimes in the President’s dresser drawer right now if I make a wild guess. Without any means of inspecting the drawer or getting the President to tell me about this, I cannot form a rational, justified belief that there are exactly 7 dimes in the drawer. It may be true there are exactly 7 dimes in the drawer and it may be true that the only way I can say this true thing is if I just assert it on faith. But it is also true that it is wildly improbable that my guess is correct. And it would be irrational and unjustified for me to base any decisions on my belief in the exact 7 dimes in the President’s dresser drawer. And it would be even worse if I decided as a matter of faith I must believe in the exact 7 dimes in the President’s drawer even against contrary evidence and even if it comes to light, say, that Presidents are forbidden by law to keep any of their money in cash. In those cases, the belief is not only unjustified and unlikely but downright counter-rational.
So, any given faith-based belief may be subject to rational corroboration. If it gets rational corroboration it ceases to be a faith-based belief and simply becomes a reason-based one. If it does not get rational corroboration, then it should not be believed with any more certainty than evidence allows. If there is only a .001% chance, say, that the President has exactly 7 dimes in his drawer (assuming we could even determine such a probability somehow) then it is simply unjustified to hold the belief that he has the exact 7 dimes and irrational to hold the belief with any feeling of sureness.
Might he turn out, improbably, to have the exact 7 dimes in his drawer? Yes, but you still wouldn’t be justified in believing so until you had actual reasons to know that and you would be irrational to assert such an unjustified belief confidently. You would be exercising your will to assent to a proposition’s truth illicitly liberally.
Your Thoughts?
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For more on faith, read any or all posts in my “Disambiguating Faith” series. It is unnecessary to read all its posts to understand any given one.
Trustworthiness, Loyalty, And Honesty
Faith As Loyally Trusting Those Insufficiently Proven To Be Trustworthy
Blind Faith: How Faith Traditions Turn Trust Without Warrant Into A Test Of Loyalty
The Threatening Abomination Of The Faithless
Rational Beliefs, Rational Actions, And When It Is Rational To Act On What You Don’t Think Is True
Are True Gut Feelings And Epiphanies Beliefs Justified By Faith?
Faith Is Neither Brainstorming, Hypothesizing, Nor Simply Reasoning Counter-Intuitively
Faith In The Sub-, Pre-, Or Un-conscious
Can Rationality Overcome Faith?
Faith As A Form Of Rationalization Unique To Religion
Faith As Deliberate Commitment To Rationalization
Faith As Corruption Of Children’s Intellectual Judgment
Faith As Subjectivity Which Claims Objectivity
Faith Is Preconditioned By Doubt, But Precludes Serious Doubting
Soul Searching With Clergy Guy
Faith As Admirable Infinite Commitment For Finite Reasons
Maximal Self-Realization In Self-Obliteration: The Existential Paradox of Heroic Self-Sacrifice
How A Lack Of Belief In God May Differ From Various Kinds Of Beliefs That Gods Do Not Exist
Not All Beliefs Held Without Certainty Are Faith Beliefs
Defending My Definition Of Faith As “Belief Or Trust Beyond Rational Warrant”
The Evidence-Impervious Agnostic Theists
Faith Which Exploits Infinitesimal Probabilities As Openings For Strong Affirmations
How Just Opposing Faith, In Principle, Means You Actually Don’t Have Faith, In Practice




August 24, 2009 at 8:13 pm
Daniel Fincke 
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House ruled out the hallucination because it was symptomatic of a completely different problem that the pastor was facing which was psychological in nature, not physiological. The pastor had been falsely accused of raping a boy which led him to become a drunken, god-resenting theist. The premise for his reinstatement of faith at the end of the show was due to how so many small circumstances built up and led to his not only being healed by House but that the process of investigation caused the boy that made the false accusation to come clean. To the pastor, it was a monumental, life-changing event. Not proof of god by any means but to the pastor he saw differently.
At least, that was my take on it.
Thanks aeroslin, that’s quite clarifying. It was pastor’s interpretation was the “too many coincidences not to be providence” which functioned independently of House’s medical investigations. Was there some sort of parallel where House had to correlate to different streams of information? I guess the way that he separated the psychological and physiological maladies maybe?
[...] belief formation and justification practices which go by the name of “faith.” I have argued that it is neither rational nor ethically responsible to believe that for which you do…. It is neither rational nor ethically responsible to believe people on authority when they have [...]
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[...] Having a true belief through an unjustified means does not equate to holding that belief rationally,…. Strong intuitions that come to us from pre-conscious, sub-conscious, or unconscious reasoning processes or directly through perception can be sources of valuable insights but they should not be confused for divine revelations or any other kinds of beliefs justifiable on “faith alone,” and they should not be accepted on face value if they contradict firmer beliefs we hold or in any other way do not stand up to rational scrutiny. Sometimes we rationally should explore counter-intuitive possibilities and test low-probability hypotheses, but all such endeavors are distinct from faith because faith does not just explore seemingly irrational hypotheses but rather it commits to them in defiance even of their outright refutation, distorts all other beliefs which contradict them, and prejudicially squelches many lines of future speculation because of its dogmatic commitment. [...]
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[...] Disambiguating Faith: Faith As Guessing [...]
[...] Disambiguating Faith: Faith As Guessing [...]
[...] belief formation and justification practices which go by the name of “faith.” I have argued that it is neither rational nor ethically responsible to believe in propositions for w…. It is neither rational nor ethically responsible to believe people on authority when they do not [...]
[...] Disambiguating Faith: Faith As Guessing [...]
[...] Disambiguating Faith: Faith As Guessing [...]