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I argue in my moral philosophy that our highest ethical goods are to maximally flourish in our power and in our will to power. When I say this, many immediately assume that my ethics must be quite at odds with the sorts of concerns for selfless respect for duty and for the autonomy of all [...]
Archive for the ‘Duty’ Category
Why Be Morally Dutiful, Fair, or Self-Sacrificing If The Ethical Life Is About Power?
November 17th, 2011 
Daniel Fincke 
Posted in Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Duty, Duty, Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Historical Ethics, Historical Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Historical Philosophy, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Teleology, Virtues, Virtues 
Tags: Kant's moral philosophy 
8 Comments »Moral Perfectionism, Moral Pragmatism, Free Love Ethics, and Adultery
September 19th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Kelly: You are a moral absolutist, Jaime. Jaime: Nonsense. You are the one who wants to impose monogamy on everyone, whether they like it or not. Kelly: No, when we talked the other day, I conceded it was your right to have whatever kinds of open relationships you wanted. I only said that, given human [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Autonomy, Autonomy, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Duty, Duty, Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Love, Love, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Psychology, Psychology, Sex, Virtues, Virtues Tags: Adultery, Anti-Adultery, Anti-Monogamy, Changes in Moral Values, Consequentialism, Marriage, Monogamy, Moral Absolutism, Moral Idealism, Moral Institutions, Moral Perfectionism, Moral Revisionism, Moral Values, Non-Moral Values, Pleasure and Pain, Polyamory, Promiscuity, Utilitarianism 60 Comments »In Honor of Firefighters
September 11th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Today, remembering 9/11, I have been thinking about parts of two posts I wrote in 2009 which mean a lot to me, in which I meditated on the bravery of the firefighters. One of the posts is about my father, a retired New York City firefighter and fire marshal, and the other is about the [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Duty, Duty, Virtues, Virtues Tags: 9/11 Firefighters, Firefighters, Heroism, William Fincke, William X. Fincke, William Xavier Fincke No Comments »Is it Too Risky to Debate Morality's Foundations in the Public Square?
February 28th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Jean Kazez argues that the public square is not the place for atheists to be arguing that science and religion are incompatible. I strongly reject her position on this point because not only do I believe that ordinary people are quite capable of handling a vigorous, no-holds-barred debate about religion but because I believe the [...]
Posted in Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Cultural Secularism, Cultural Secularism, Duty, Duty, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Philosophy Of Religion, Politics, Politics, Religion, Religious Extremism, Religious Extremism, Right Wing Politics, Right Wing Politics, Sarah Palin, Sarah Palin, Secularism, Skepticism, Skepticism Tags: J.L. Mackie, Jean Kazez, Jean-Paul Sartre, Moral Anti-Realism, Moral Error Theory, Moral Realism, Pragmatism, Russell Blackford, Sam Harris, The Death of God 8 Comments »The Religious Conservative's False Choice: "Big Brother" Or "Heavenly Father"
February 23rd, 2011 Daniel Fincke In an e-mail to me, Caroline proposes thought provoking reasons for non-believers to encourage (or at least to not actively discourage) religious beliefs: It would also be nice if people would carry out actions in good conscience of just being decent human beings rather than in fear of reprisal in the afterlife, but as there [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Authoritarianism, Authoritarianism, Authority, Authority, Autonomy, Autonomy, Christianity, Christianity, Civil Liberties, Civil Liberties, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Cultural Secularism, Cultural Secularism, Duty, Duty, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Fundamentalism, Fundamentalism, George W. Bush, George W. Bush, Hypocrisy, Hypocrisy, Law, Law, Law & Politics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, News Discussion, News Discussion, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Philosophy Of Religion, Political Secularism, Political Secularism, Politics, Politics, Psychology, Psychology, Religion, Religion, Religious Extremism, Religious Extremism, Right Wing Politics, Right Wing Politics, Secularism, Social Psychology, Social Psychology, Sociology, Sociology, Theocrats, Theocrats, Torture, Torture, Virtues, Virtues, World Affairs, World Affairs Tags: Political Philosophy, Social Contract, Victor Frankl 3 Comments »TOP Q: “Do Children Have Higher Moral Status Than Adults?”
February 9th, 2011 Daniel Fincke In his book Moral Status and Human Life: The Case for Children’s Superiority, law professor James Dwyer argues that children are not merely equal to adults in moral status but actually have a higher moral status than adults. Below is a brief video in which he sketches out the broad contours of his thought on moral [...]
Posted in Abortion, Abortion, Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Autonomy, Autonomy, Bio-Medical Ethics, Bio-Medical Ethics, Civil Rights, Civil Rights, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Duty, Duty, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Law, Law, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Teleology, Teleology, Today's Open Philosophical Question (TOP Q) Tags: Children, Children's Rights 2 Comments »Deriving An Atheistic, Naturalistic, Realist Account Of Morality
January 20th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Tom Gilson thinks that theism accounts for moral realism better than atheism does. My reasons for rejecting that view are here (though I am interested in tailoring a future post specifically to Gilson’s particular way of arguing for a theist basis for moral realism). For now, however, rather than counter Gilson’s positive claims for theism’s [...]
Posted in Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Duty, Duty, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Teleology, Teleology, Virtues, Virtues 7 Comments »How Our Morality Realizes Our Humanity
July 11th, 2010 Daniel Fincke In a previous post, I discussed the intrinsic connection between being and goodness and between functional activity and being. I argued, for example that the various components of a heart need to function as a heart to be a heart and similarly that a human being must act morally to realize her humanity. Specifically, I [...]
Posted in Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Duty, Duty, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Historical Ethics, Historical Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Intellectual Virtues, Intellectual Virtues, Love, Love, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Teleology, Teleology, Virtues, Virtues Tags: Aristotle, Empowerment, Existentialism, Functionalism, Power, Teleological Ethics 13 Comments »Disambiguating Faith: Why Faith Is Unethical (Or “In Defense Of The Ethical Obligation To Always Proportion Belief To Evidence”)
June 21st, 2010 Daniel Fincke A couple of weeks ago, I argued that there was a real distinction between “lacking a belief in any God or gods” on the one hand and “believing there is no God (or gods)” on the other hand. Primarily I saw the heart of the distinction as resting with the difference between on the one [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Authority, Autonomy, Contemporary Ethics, Cultural Secularism, Disambiguating Faith, Duty, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Evidence, Faith, Featured, Intellectual Vices, Intellectual Virtues, Law, Metaethics, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Political Secularism, Politics, Rationalism, Religion, Religious Extremism, Secularism, Separation of Church and State, Skepticism, Teleology, Virtues, Why I Am Not A Christian Tags: Agnostic Atheism, Agnostic Theism, Belief, Belief Apportioned To Evidence, Evolutionary Epistemology, Evolutionary Ethics, Gnostic Atheism, Gnostic Theism, Indirect Consequentialism, Moral Formalism, Moral Rationalism, Principle of Sufficient Reason, Rational Belief 10 Comments »Moral Actions, Moral Sentiments, Moral Motives, and Moral Justifications: More On The Nun Excommunicated For Approving A Life-Saving Abortion
May 18th, 2010 Daniel Fincke In reply to my post on the story of Sister Margaret McBride whom the Catholic Church “automatically excommunicated” for helping to give the go-ahead to an abortion claimed necessary for saving the life of an 11 week pregnant mother, I have already received two interesting replies. The first challenged the medical argument for the necessity of [...]
Posted in Abortion, Applied Ethics, Authority, Autonomy, Bio-Medical Ethics, Christianity, Contemporary Ethics, Duty, Ethics, Featured, Feminism, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Religion, Roman Catholic Church, Secularism, Teleology, Virtues, Women's Issues Tags: Action Theory, Bishop Thomas J. Olmsted, Consequentialism, Doctrine of Double Effect, Excommunication, John Garvie, Moral Judgment, Moral Justification, Moral Motivation, Moral Sentiments, Phoenix Archdiocese, Sister Margaret McBride, Vice, Vicious Motives, Vicious Sentiments, Virtue Ethics 5 Comments »Legalism Over Life: Nun Supports Life-Saving Abortion And Gets Excommunicated
May 18th, 2010 Daniel Fincke Feministing: Sister Margaret McBride has been demoted from her position at St. Joseph’s Hospital and Medical Center in Phoenix, AZ after participating in the approval of an abortion for a critically ill patient in 2009. McBride was part of the hospital ethics committee that approved an abortion for a patient with pulmonary hypertension, which can be [...]
Posted in Abortion, Applied Ethics, Bio-Medical Ethics, Duty, Ethics, Featured, News, News Discussion, Philosophy, Religion, Roman Catholic Church, Women's Rights Tags: Bishop Thomas J. Olmsted, Consequentialism, Doctrine of Double Effect, Excommunication, Feministing, John Garvie, Phoenix Archdiocese, Sister Margaret McBride 12 Comments »Maximal Self-Realization In Self-Obliteration: The Existential Paradox of Heroic Self-Sacrifice
April 10th, 2010 Daniel Fincke Last summer I wrote a number of posts through which I sought to disambiguate the various senses of the word faith and in the process distinguish the various virtuous ethical and epistemic practices for which faith is typically confused by means of ambiguous equivocations. I attempted to distinguish the virtues of hope, loyalty, trust, intuitional [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Disambiguating Faith, Duty, Epistemic Justification, Ethics, Faith, Featured, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Secularism, Teleology, Virtues Tags: 9/11, 9/11 Firefighters, Courage, Existential Justification, Existentialism, Functionalism, Idealism, Indirect Consequentialism, Loyalty, Moral Perfectionism, Perfectionism No Comments »A Brief Overview Of My Dissertation
November 7th, 2009 Daniel Fincke Nietzsche’s writings on morality are famously provocative and controversial. His criticisms of morality in both theory and practice are so extensive and rhetorically scathing that many philosophers assume that he can offer little or nothing constructive to moral philosophy. Additionally, his glorification of the will to power sounds prima facie like a celebration of excessively [...]
Posted in Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Autonomy, Contemporary Ethics, Cultural Secularism, Duty, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Featured, Historical Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Morality, New Atheism, Nietzsche, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Virtues Tags: "On Deriving and Defending An Axiology of the Will To Power", Absolutism, Christian Morality, Consequentialism, Dissertation, Duty, Happiness, Heteronomy, Immoralism, Indirect Consequentialism, Instrumental Goods, Intrinsic Goods, Jonathan Haidt, Kantian Moral Philosophy, Moral Absolutism, Pleasure, Self-Overcoming, Virtue, Will to Power 3 Comments »Philosophical Ethics: Can We Uphold A Moral Law And A Principle That We Should Break It?
October 19th, 2009 Daniel Fincke In a series of posts this semester, I am going to blog all (or almost all) the lecture topics for the two Philosophical Ethics classes I am teaching this semester. Each of these posts will primarily explicate the reading or a theme that dominated class discussion in a way that should be accessible to novices [...]
Posted in Andrew Sullivan, Applied Ethics, Civil Liberties, Contemporary Ethics, Duty, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Featured, Law, Law & Politics, Moral Psychology, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Politics, Torture Tags: Chris Bodenner, Hard Truths, Hypocrisy, Lying, Matt Damon, Moral Dilemmas, Slavoj Zizek, Truth, Universalizability 10 Comments »Philosophical Ethics: A Possible Kantian Formula For Determining The Permissibility Of Self-Defense
October 14th, 2009 Daniel Fincke In a series of posts this semester, I am going to blog all (or almost all) the lecture topics for the two Philosophical Ethics classes I am teaching this semester. Each of these posts will primarily explicate the reading or a theme that dominated class discussion in a way that should be accessible to novices [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Autonomy, Contemporary Ethics, Duty, Ethics, Featured, Historical Ethics, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Torture Tags: Categorical Imperative, Christine Korsgaar, Counter-Coercion, Immanuel Kant, Kant's Murderer At the Door Example, Lies For Good Ends, Lying, Permissible Lying, Right To Lie, Self-Defense, White Lies No Comments »Philosophical Ethics: “But Why MUST I?” Kant’s Ironic Formulation Of Liberty As Duty
October 4th, 2009 Daniel Fincke In a series of posts this semester, I am going to blog all (or almost all) the lecture topics for the two Philosophical Ethics classes I am teaching this semester. Each of these posts will primarily explicate the reading or a theme that dominated class discussion in a way that should be accessible to novices [...]
Posted in Authority, Autonomy, Duty, Ethics, Featured, Historical Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Secularism Tags: Deontology, Kant, Nietzsche, Rational Action, Reason No Comments »Philosophical Ethics: Kant, The Good Will, And Rational Actions
October 4th, 2009 Daniel Fincke In a series of posts this semester, I am going to blog all (or almost all) the lecture topics for the two Philosophical Ethics classes I am teaching this semester. Each of these posts will primarily explicate the reading or a theme that dominated class discussion in a way that should be accessible to novices [...]
Philosophical Ethics: Does Calling Someone Evil Explain Anything About Them?
October 2nd, 2009 Daniel Fincke In a series of posts this semester, I am going to blog all (or almost all) the lecture topics for the two Philosophical Ethics classes I am teaching this semester. Each of these posts will primarily explicate the reading or a theme that dominated class discussion in a way that should be accessible to novices [...]
Posted in Contemporary Ethics, Duty, Ethics, Featured, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Plato Tags: Augustine, Confessions, Cruelty, Evil, Evil As Explanatory, Gilbert Harman, Good and Evil, Hitler, Holocaust, Ill Will, Malignancy, Meno, Moral Explanations, Moral Facts, Nicholas Sturgeon, Right and Wrong, Socrates, Weakness of Will No Comments »Philosophical Ethics: J.L. Mackie’s Error Theory And Jonathan Harrison’s Critique Thereof
October 2nd, 2009 Daniel Fincke In a series of posts this semester, I am going to blog all (or almost all) the lecture topics for the two Philosophical Ethics classes I am teaching this semester. Each of these posts will primarily explicate the reading or a theme that dominated class discussion in a way that should be accessible to novices [...]
Posted in Contemporary Ethics, Duty, Ethics, Featured, Historical Ethics, Metaethics, Naturalistic Fallacy, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy Tags: Categorical Imperatives, Facts About Oughts, Fariness, Hypothetical Imperatives, Is/Ought Distinction, J.L. Mackie, Jonathan Harrison, Moral Error Theory, Moral Facts, Moral Objectivity, Must, Natural Selection of Morality, Oughts, Should, The Invention of Morality, Transformations in Moral Codes, Usefulness, Utilitarianism 6 Comments »Camels With Hammers Philosophy
September 27th, 2009 Daniel Fincke After this introductory paragraph, every sentence in this post will summarize and link a different post expressing my views, primarily on topics related to atheism, philosophy, and ethics—which are the primary preoccupations of this blog. I am organizing all of these links into this one summary statement of “Camels With Hammers’ Philosophy.” This post will [...]
Posted in About This Blog, Applied Ethics, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Authoritarianism, Authority, Autonomy, Christianity, Contemporary Ethics, Cultural Secularism, Duty, Epistemology, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Evolutionary Psychology, Faith, Featured, Fundamentalism, God, Historical Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Homophobia, Homosexuality, Intellectual Vices, Intellectual Virtues, Metaethics, Metaphysics, Moral Psychology, Nietzsche, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Political Secularism, Politics, Psychology, Religion and Science, Religious Extremism, Religious Rights, Religious Secularism, Secularism, Sociobiology, Teleology, Virtues, Why I Am Not A Christian Tags: Camels With Hammers 3 Comments »Philosophical Ethics: Bruce Russell On Theories About What Makes An Action Rational Or Not
September 24th, 2009 Daniel Fincke In a series of posts this semester, I am going to blog all (or almost all) the lecture topics for the two Philosophical Ethics classes I am teaching this semester. Each of these posts will primarily explicate the reading or a theme that dominated class discussion in a way that should be accessible to novices [...]
Posted in Atheistic Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Duty, Ethics, Featured, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy Tags: Agent-Neutral Externalism, Agent-Neutral Internalism, Agent-Relative Externalism, Agent-Relative Internalism, Bruce Russell, Desires, Moral Externalism, Moral Internalism, Moral Universalizability, Objective Reasons For Actions, Philosophical Ethics 1 Comment »Philosophical Ethics: R.M. Hare On Moral Consistency As A Form Of Logical Consistency
September 22nd, 2009 Daniel Fincke In a series of posts this semester, I am going to blog all (or almost all) the lecture topics for the two Philosophical Ethics classes I am teaching this semester. Each of these posts will primarily explicate the reading or a theme that dominated class discussion in a way that should be accessible to novices [...]
Posted in Atheistic Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Duty, Ethics, Featured, Historical Ethics, Metaethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy Tags: Act Utilitarianism, Deontology, Irrational Moral Judgments, John Searle, Judgementalism, Moral Formalism, Moral Judgments, Moral Situationalism, Moral Universalizability, Ought Statements, Practical Contradictions, Prescriptivism, Promises, R.M. Hare, Rational Moral Judgment, Utilitarianism No Comments »Disambiguating Faith: Faith As Admirable Infinite Commitment For Finite Reasons
September 11th, 2009 Daniel Fincke May your strength give us strength, may your faith give us faith, may your hope give us hope, may your love give us love. In recent weeks I have distinguished and criticized numerous distinct belief formation and justification practices which go by the name of “faith.” I have argued that it is neither rational nor [...]
Posted in Atheistic Ethics, Disambiguating Faith, Duty, Ethics, Faith, Featured, Moral Psychology, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Virtues Tags: 2001, 9/11, 9/11 Firefighters, Bravery, Commitment, Courage, Faith as Courage, Infinite Commitment, Kierkegaard, Proportioning Actions To Reasons, September 11, Supererogatory, Will No Comments »Further Towards A “Non-Moral” Standard Of Ethical Evaluation
July 17th, 2009 Daniel Fincke In reply to a recent post, Tyler writes: Your definition of ethics and morality is well taken and allows for further interesting debate on culture and moral systems but it still requires assumption of benefit. Defining phrases like “fully flourishing life” and “most excellent characters we can develop” require a standard of evaluation which I [...]
Posted in Authority, Duty, Ethical Pluralism, Uncategorized Tags: Arete, Atheistic Ethics, Autonomy, Care, Equality, Ethics, Evolutionary Psychology, Excellence, Fairness, Fruits and Ladders, Harm, Human Flourishing, Ingroup Loyalty, Jonathan Haidt, Justice, Metaethics, Moral Goods, Moral Psychology, Moralism, Motives, Non-Moral Goods, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Purity, Quality vs. Quantity, Sociobiology, Tyler Samien, Values, Virtues No Comments »Kantian Reasons To Lie To The Murderer At The Door?
July 14th, 2009 Daniel Fincke Michael Cholbi thinks he has some: First, the lie is not meant to advance the happiness either of the liar or of the potential murder victim, but to thwart the abuse of the victim’s autonomy that her murder would represent. Hence, if lying to the murderer is manipulation at all, it is manipulation in the [...]
Posted in Autonomy, Duty, Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Rape, Sex Tags: Autonomy, Deontology, Kant, Kant's Symmetry Thesis, Liberalism, Lying, Masturbation, Michael Cholbi, Moral Dilemmas, PEA Soup No Comments »
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