.png){kind=logo}
4 Misconceptions About the Nature of Offense Here are four common sense assumptions about giving and taking offense that I think are fundamentally mistaken and which atheists need to argue against: “You have every right to be offended, but you don’t have the right to censor others just because you’re offended.” “You cannot blame people [...]
Archive for the ‘Moral Psychology’ Category
No, Not Everyone Has A Moral Right To Be Offended By Just Any Satire or Criticism
February 15th, 2012 
Daniel Fincke 
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Atheism, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethics, Ethics, Free Speech, Free Speech, Intellectual Vices, Intellectual Vices, Intellectual Virtues, Intellectual Virtues, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Philosophy Of Religion, Religion, Religion, Religious Satire, Religious Satire, Virtues, Virtues 
Tags: "You Have The Right To Be Offended", Andy Drennon, Denial of Atheists From Gelato shop, Gelatogate, In Defense of Blasphemy, Moral Rights, Offense as a Moral Category, Offense As Value Judgment, Religion, Religious Offense, Satirizing Religion, Skepticon IV, Values Perceptions 
53 Comments »Is Emotivistic Moral Nihilism Rationally Consistent?
February 2nd, 2012 Daniel Fincke Taylor: I know you’re bothered that I don’t believe in objective values, Pat, but I assure you I still care about the same things that you do. I just don’t say I’m being “objective” when I do so. Pat: I don’t know why you think I would be impressed by that. Taylor: Well when you [...]
Baby Morality
January 12th, 2012 Daniel Fincke Yale psychologist and author of How Pleasure Works: The New Science of Why We Like What We Like, Paul Bloom discusses the evidence that certain behaviors, dispositions, and feelings on which morality is built are innate in us and present already in babies: Relatedly, Alison Gopnik’s The Philosophical Baby: What Children’s Minds Tell Us About [...]
Posted in Ethics, Ethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Psychology, Psychology Tags: Babies, babies and morality, Compassion 2 Comments »The Case Against Literature As Moral Education
December 18th, 2011 Daniel Fincke The other day, Corey Robin, author of The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism From Edmund Burke to Sarah Palin, eviscerated Christopher Hitchens over two morally dubious comments he made. Robin concluded from them that, contrary to his reputation, Hitchens was not at all an internationalist but rather “a narcissist, the most provincial spirit of all”. Robin ended his post quoting [...]
Podcast Series Covering The History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps
December 2nd, 2011 Daniel Fincke Earlier today, I posted a link to an exceptional, accessible podcast introduction to the philosophies of the ancient cynics. The whole series that that podcast comes from is a marvelous idea and the few I’ve listened to are just great. It’s called “The History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps” and it’s a must listen, basically a [...]
Posted in Epistemology, Epistemology, Ethics, Ethics, Historical Ethics, Historical Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Historical Philosophy, Intellectual Vices, Intellectual Virtues, Intellectual Virtues, Love, Love, Metaethics, Metaethics, Metaphysics, Metaphysics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Plato, Plato, Teleology, Teleology, Virtues, Virtues Tags: Anaxagoras, Anaximander, Anaximines, Ancient Atomists, Aristotle, Aristotle on Biology, Aristotle on Four Causes, Aristotle on God, Aristotle on Logic, Aristotle on Mind, Aristotle on Physics, Aristotle on Soul, Aristotle's Life and Works, Aristotle's Politics, Aristotle's Rhetoric, Atomists, Charmides, Cratylus, Cynics, Cyrenaics, Empedocles, Epicurus, Euthydemus, Gorgias, Hellenistic Philosophy, Heraclitus, Hippocrates, Melissus, Parmenides, Plato, Plato's Cratylus, Plato's Erotic Dialogues, Plato's Gorgias, Plato's Parmenides, Plato's Republic, Platonic Love, Presocratics, Pythagoras, Socrates, Sophists, Sorabji on Aristotle, Thales, The Republic, The Sophist, Zeno 8 Comments »Why Bother Blaming People At All? Isn’t That Just Judgmental?
November 25th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Before moving on to addressing the question of when it is right or wrong to get offended, let me quickly address a certain attitude that arises a lot in response to my posts on morality. I sense in the tone of a lot of comments I get in general that there is a fear of [...]
Posted in Atheism, Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Christianity, Christianity, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Hypocrisy, Hypocrisy, Intellectual Vices, Intellectual Vices, Intellectual Virtues, Intellectual Virtues, Jesus, Jesus, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Rationalism, Virtues, Virtues Tags: Blame, Blame and Determinism, Determinism, Free Will, Immoralism, Judgmentalism, Moralism 32 Comments »Yes, We Can Blame People For Their Feelings, Not Just Their Actions
November 24th, 2011 Daniel Fincke “You can’t blame people for how they feel, only for what they do.” “You have every right to be offended, but you don’t have the right to censor others just because you’re offended.” In this post and the next one, I want to explain why I think these two common moral sentiments are quite mistaken—or, [...]
Answering Objections From A Moral Nihilist
November 22nd, 2011 Daniel Fincke Earlier today I explained why moral nihilism is self-contradictory in reply to a comment by thedudediogenes on my earlier attack on moral nihilism from last Friday. thedudediogenes also wrote: How I look at morality is influenced most strongly by Nietzsche, Mackie, Leiter, Garner, Greene and Blackford. I think we project our moral sentiments onto the world. [...]
Why Moral Nihilism Is Self-Contradictory
November 22nd, 2011 Daniel Fincke My post against moral nihilism on Friday received many stimulating replies. I hope to address those replies, or their general concerns, as there is time and occasion in future posts. In this post–and in another I have written for later today–I want to start by answering thedudediogenes. He is the most seemingly self-conscious moral nihilist [...]
Posted in Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Epistemology, Ethics, Ethics, Metaethics, Metaethics, Metaphysics, Metaphysics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Naturalistic Fallacy, Naturalistic Fallacy, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Teleology, Teleology 19 Comments »Thinking According To Scale
November 21st, 2011 Daniel Fincke PZ and Crommunist offer nice denunciations of the significance of a graphic which has been going around the internet which concludes that the chance of any given individual alive today ever existing was 1 in 102,685,000. Below the fold is the graphic, key snippets of their remarks and the lesson to draw for how we should consider [...]
Posted in Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Biology, Biology, Ethics, Ethics, Evolution, Evolution, Evolutionary Psychology, Evolutionary Psychology, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Naturalistic Fallacy, Naturalistic Fallacy, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Probability, Psychology, Psychology, PZ Myers, PZ Myers, Science, Science, Sociobiology, Sociobiology Tags: Crommunist Manifesto, Grind the universe down to its finest powder, Hierarchical Reductionism, PZ Myers, Richard Dawkins, Richard Dawkins on Reductionism, Terry Pratchett, The Blind Watchmaker 3 Comments »A Philosophical Polemic Against Moral Nihilism
November 18th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Jesse is undeterred by my argument that at least some of our moralities (or elements of them) can be objectively defended even though the physical universe (taken as an entirety) does not care about them: Daniel– I haven’t gone deeply enough through the other posts you linked to, and I will — but I think [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Epistemology, Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Evidence, Evidence, Intellectual Vices, Intellectual Vices, Intellectual Virtues, Intellectual Virtues, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Teleology, Teleology, Virtues, Virtues 31 Comments »Why Be Morally Dutiful, Fair, or Self-Sacrificing If The Ethical Life Is About Power?
November 17th, 2011 Daniel Fincke I argue in my moral philosophy that our highest ethical goods are to maximally flourish in our power and in our will to power. When I say this, many immediately assume that my ethics must be quite at odds with the sorts of concerns for selfless respect for duty and for the autonomy of all [...]
Posted in Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Duty, Duty, Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Historical Ethics, Historical Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Historical Philosophy, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Teleology, Virtues, Virtues Tags: Kant's moral philosophy 8 Comments »Immoralism?
November 14th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Taylor: I’ve been reading a lot of Nietzsche of late, like you recommended. Pat: Oh? And what do you think? What are you taking away from it? Taylor: I really like what he has to say about immoralism. I realized I am an immoralist. Pat: How so? How are you interpreting that word? Taylor: Well, he makes this really fascinating [...]
Posted in Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Authority, Authority, Autonomy, Autonomy, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy 10 Comments »Is Oxytocin The “Morality Molecule”
November 7th, 2011 Daniel Fincke That is Paul Zak’s theory. The video is fascinating: Now I just need to find 8 people to hug me everyday. (via Philosopher’s Haze, who you can read for a summary if you cannot watch the video for some reason). Patricia Churchland’s book Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us about Morality explores the role of Oxycotin in morality [...]
Posted in Biology, Biology, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophy, Psychology, Psychology Tags: Adam Smith, Empathy, Oxytocin, Paul Zak, Trustworthiness 9 Comments »Qualia Soup on Morality Part 3: Of Objectivity and Oughts
November 6th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Qualia Soup makes the case for a J.L. Mackie sort of subjectivism in ethics against William Lane Craig. I think more can be said for objectivity than he allows. As I summarized last week, in my own objections to Craig’s positions: I, for one, am convinced atheists can have a perfectly fine naturalistic ontology of objective goodness, which allows us [...]
Posted in Ethics, Ethics, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Naturalistic Fallacy, Naturalistic Fallacy, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy Tags: David Hume, Defense of Moral Subjectivism, Error Theory, J.L. Mackie, Projectivism No Comments »Force and Reason
October 21st, 2011 Daniel Fincke In previous posts (like Rational Passional Persuasion and On Zealously, Tentatively, and Perspectivally Holding Viewpoints) I have argued that there is a proper place for emotional appeals as part of a rational argument. In the last couple of weeks, though, I have also argued firmly against certain kinds of emotional appeals that I consider abusive, counter-productive, and hypocritical [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Authority, Authority, Autonomy, Autonomy, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Epistemology, Ethics, Ethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Virtues, Virtues Tags: Coercion, Emotional Appeals, Emotional Persuasion, Emotions in Reason, Emotivism, Force of Reason, Manipulation, Objective Valuing, Perspectivalism, Persuasion, Rational Appeals, Rational Force, Rational Persuasion, Rationality, Reason and Emotion, Subjective Valuing, Values 15 Comments »From Is To Ought: How Normativity Fits Into Naturalism
October 19th, 2011 Daniel Fincke In a previous post, I laid out a number of reasons that people think values cannot be grounded in naturalistic ways or that if they were they would be values which would threaten vulnerable groups. In this post, I want to address the charge of the naturalistic fallacy: i.e., the claim that you cannot derive [...]
Nietzsche: We Cannot “Selflessly” Investigate Morality
October 14th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Nietzsche writes a lot of things which attack the ideal of selflessness. Yet he does not make any blanket call for an ideal of unmitigated, small-minded selfishness. He calls for certain kinds of self-concern and in some cases certain kinds of self-denial in the pursuit of higher purposes or higher ideals of self-cultivation. Rather than [...]
Posted in Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Autonomy, Autonomy, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Epistemology, Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Evidence, Evidence, Historical Ethics, Historical Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Intellectual Virtues, Intellectual Virtues, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy 6 Comments »Nietzsche: “‘Good’ Is No Longer Good When One’s Neighbor Mouths It”
September 26th, 2011 Daniel Fincke I argued yesterday that Nietzsche believes that there are objective standards of value for assessing divergent moralities. In reply, Juno (of the blog Letters from Le Vrai) asks what I would make of Section 43 of Beyond Good and Evil which reads, in full, as follows: Are these coming philosophers new friends of “truth”? That is probable enough, for [...]
Posted in Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Autonomy, Autonomy, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Epistemology, Epistemology, Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Historical Ethics, Historical Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Historical Philosophy, Intellectual Virtues, Intellectual Virtues, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Virtues, Virtues 3 Comments »Nietzsche: Moral Absolutism and Moral Relativism Are “Equally Childish”
September 25th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Recently Joel Marks, a career moral philosopher, concluded that the moral certitude he has felt and argued for his entire career was built as much on faith as many theists’ belief in God is. And in response he swung radically in the opposite direction and came to believe that there can be no rational objectivity [...]
Posted in Atheism, Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Historical Ethics, Historical Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Historical Philosophy, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Teleology, Teleology 22 Comments »The Moral Toll of Executions on the Consciences of Executioners
September 22nd, 2011 Daniel Fincke Allen Ault is the retired director of the Georgia Department of Corrections and former warden of the Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison which handled Troy Davis. Ault oversaw executions for the state of Georgia. He is now Eastern Kentucky University’s dean of “College of Justice and Society” and well-informed from an academic perspective about the [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Authoritarianism, Authoritarianism, Civil Rights, Civil Rights, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethics, Ethics, Law, Law, Law & Politics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, News, News Discussion, News Discussion, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Politics, Politics, Videos Tags: Allen Ault, Anti-Death Penalty, Death Penalty, Dennis O'Neill, Ed Schultz, Ed Show, Effects of Executions on Executioners, Georgia Department of Corrections, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison, Jeanne Woodford, Rachel Maddow, Reginald Wilkinson, Rick Perry, Ron McAndrew, Terry Collins, Troy Anthony Davis, Troy Davis 7 Comments »Defining Intrinsic Goodness, Using Marriage As An Example
September 20th, 2011 Daniel Fincke The other day, I wrote a post exploring a major reason that getting away without penalties would not be enough to make at least some kinds of wrongdoing in our best interests. I was taking one of a few possible tacks at answering Glaucon’s question in Plato’s Republic as to how being a just person might be [...]
Moral Perfectionism, Moral Pragmatism, Free Love Ethics, and Adultery
September 19th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Kelly: You are a moral absolutist, Jaime. Jaime: Nonsense. You are the one who wants to impose monogamy on everyone, whether they like it or not. Kelly: No, when we talked the other day, I conceded it was your right to have whatever kinds of open relationships you wanted. I only said that, given human [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Autonomy, Autonomy, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Duty, Duty, Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Love, Love, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Psychology, Psychology, Sex, Virtues, Virtues Tags: Adultery, Anti-Adultery, Anti-Monogamy, Changes in Moral Values, Consequentialism, Marriage, Monogamy, Moral Absolutism, Moral Idealism, Moral Institutions, Moral Perfectionism, Moral Revisionism, Moral Values, Non-Moral Values, Pleasure and Pain, Polyamory, Promiscuity, Utilitarianism 60 Comments »Why Getting Away With Wrongdoing Does Not Make It Worth It
September 18th, 2011 Daniel Fincke This past week across numerous different classes I am teaching in both ancient philosophy and ethics, I have been talking with my students about Plato’s Republic, Book II. We have discussed whether there would be any intrinsic goodness to justice such that it would be in our interests to choose just courses of action even [...]
On Rejecting Faith in Morality
September 16th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Update: Joel Marks has replied to this post and to my first follow up post. I have reedited this post to incorporate his remarks at the end. Joel Marks is at the Center for Bioethics at Yale University and is professor emeritus of philosophy at the University of New Haven. Though writing on ethics throughout [...]
Posted in Atheism, Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Christianity, Christianity, Ethics, Ethics, Love, Love, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Personal, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Skepticism, Skepticism 1 Comment »
Recent Comments